NATO’s transformation
Dear Visitors,
Thanks again for your continuing participation!
As you know, our online discussions follow the themes of the Seminars held by NATO’s Group of Experts on the developing Strategic Concept. The fourth such Seminar will take place on 23 February, in Washington, DC. Hosted by Supreme Allied Command Transformation and the US National Defense University, the subject of the Seminar will be the Alliance’s transformation of its structure, forces, and capabilities.
Accordingly, our next topic for discussions is, “What changes in structures, forces and capabilities are required for NATO’s transformation into an Alliance that can deal successfully with 21st century challenges?”
Please share your thoughts, concerns or questions. We will try to respond to your ideas and summarize the discussion with another live video session.
As background, please consider reading the most recent two-part edition of NATO Review, available at www.nato.int/review. The edition examined issues related to the new Strategic Concept, the Comprehensive Approach and NATO’s transformation.
Let us know what you think!
The Moderating Team
comments
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To make a long answer short, shouldn’t NATO forces be redesigned to fit into the MOB structure that the Netherlands has adopted for it’s air assets, but then in a much larger scale, using parrelisation and segmentation? Create forces that can be rapidly deployed, know when they are up for deployment and when they are up for workup and can handle the full spectrum of force utilisation, from OOTW to all out war.
Something like the US AEF, but with people in the same MOBs being based in the same geographic location.
And work should be made of jointness – getting the air-, land- and naval forces to work seamlessly together with full knowledge of each other’s capabilities. Not only this kind of jointness should be promoted, but also jointness between NATO member countries: make sure commanders are familiar with different ways of working and the capabilities of different units different countries bring to the field.
Make sure that operational commanders have experience serving not only in different combat arms (air/land/sea), but also in different countries’ forces, in order to allow them to empathise with different local problems, thought processes and solutions.
This way the force structures will be smaller, more mobile, cheaper, more flexible, offer more bang for buck and more understanding of the problems it faces in the places it’s sent to. -
Dear Moderating Team:
Sorry…After checking again I found it…It is hidden behind more recent comments. Thanks!
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Dear Moderating Team:
I have two questiosn for you:
First, I tried to find the commnent (three questions in fact) I sent for the 4th live video session on “NATO’s transformation”. I was lucky because one of the questions was chose and asked to the experts. ¿Could you please explain me where is my original written commnent?
Second, I have tried to click on the 4th live video session on “NATO’s transformation” but nothing happens…¡How could I get it to see it again?
I’ll keep participating.
Thanks..!
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How does the new strategic concept of NATO assure energy security of its member states when that is threatened? Will there be an emergency reserve available to members threatened? How will it be protected and maintained? Who will be able to draw from it and under what circumstances?
When threats to the supply lines from sources of instability arise from
rogue or irresponsible international actors arise, will NATO’s new strategic
concept allow cooperation and coordination of deterrence when the U.N. security council becomes paralyzed by nonunanmious concurrence among its permanent members? -
Dear Members of the Board
In regard to the NATO New strategic concept i have this question.
The security issues for each member country of NATO are interconnected. In the globalization times that have for some time now, develops with the great speed: the variables and the challenges of the global environment in terms of communication and reaction in front of a crisis internal or external are reduced or are going to be reduced. The dimensions of the strategy have gained many layers that overlap and extend in many directions and they are going to be more complex to deal with.
Being that the threats have increased because the dimensions have changed. Are part of the new strategy an increase in contributions and effort from each NATO country in term of military,political and economic engagement in regard to the protection and the expansion of the security?
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It would seem that the current NATO/OTAN operations environment would present the need to not just insert forces along a spectrum of future conflict, but posture military capability to respond to the high and low ends of the legacy spectrum, a complex hybrid situation, or an irregular conflict.
This would require NATO/OTAN declared military forces postured to produce desired effects with precision and a degree of flexibility that would tax the present military and political planning framework. It would also require planning capabilities that can work with member nations to integrate forces not on call as needed to produce the needed effects. Some environments may require a degree of civic and private integration, beyond the present capability to coordinate with governments and NGOs.
Would NATO/OTAN strategic concept require a more enduring full-time bureaucracy and operations capability?
How should this function be postured and based to present a NATO/OTAN solution to the policy and military operations elements?
It would seem that decision makers would need not just member options, but options which are NATO/OTAN options. (This would also include developing and sustaining the required alliance infrastructure.) What can be done to create and sustain a more alliance-centric vantage point?